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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIM-
INATION IN STATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS-In March 1951, defendant, a 
New York City policeman, was called to testify before a state grand jury 
investigating the association of city policemen with the criminal element 
of Kings County. Existing laws required public officers to execute a 
waiver of immunity to prosecution for matters to which their testimony 
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related, on pain of losing their positions.1 The defendant signed such a 
waiver, and shortly thereafter resigned from the police force. He was called 
before the same grand jury again in December 1952, and on this occasion 
was asked whether he had ever accepted bribes while a policeman. He 
refused to answer, claiming a federal and state constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination. When he persisted in his refusal after a judi-
cial determination of the continuing validity of his waiver, he was con-
victed of criminal contempt. This was affirmed by the state appellate 
courts.2 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. 
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark reserved 
questions of law that might arise if the defendant were to be subjected 
to further questioning by the grand jury. Justices Black and Douglas 
dissented on the ground that the conviction was a violation of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Regan v. New York, 349 
U.S. 58, 75 S.Ct. 585 (1955). 
The privilege against self-incrimination has traditionally been excluded 
from the elements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 
Perennial dissenters from this view have been Justices Black and Douglas.4 
The holding in the principal case does nothing to disturb this alignment. 
However, the questions raised by the concurring opinion indicate a pos-
sibility that the broadening concept of due process may yet come to include 
certain aspects of the privilege against self-incrimination. Specifically, 
doubts were expressed as to the constitutionality of any future conviction 
based upon a confession extracted from the defendant by again threaten-
ing prosecution £or contempt. The admissibility in state criminal trials 
of evidence obtained by coercion is one of the areas covered by the recent 
expansion of the due process clause.5 Beginning with the proposition 
that a confession obtained by brutality and violence could not, by itself, 
support a conviction £or murder,6 the movement reached a peak in the 
dictum in Lisenba v. California where it was asserted: "The concept of 
due process would void a trial in which, by threats or promises . . . a 
defendant was induced to testify against himself."7 When confessions 
are made after long periods of questioning (without physical abuse), 
l Immunity from prosecution is granted by 39 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) 
§381. Provisions of both the state constitution and city charter require public officers to 
waive that immunity. N.Y. CONST., art. I, §6; N.Y. City Charter (Tanzer, 1937) §903. 
2 282 App. Div. 775, 122 N.Y.S. (2d) 478 (1953); 306 N.Y. 747, 117 N.E. (2d) 921 
(1954); 306 N.Y. 875, 119 N.E. (2d) 45 (1954). 
3 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908); Adamson v. California, 332 
U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947). 
4 See Adamson v. California, note 3 supra, at 68, where their argument that the 
Fourteenth Amendment made the Bill of Rights applicable to the states is documented. 
But see Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The 
Original Understanding," 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949). 
5 See, generally, Green, "The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
Supreme Court," 46 MICH. L. REv. 869 (1948); 50 MICH. L. REv. 567 (1952). 
6 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936). 
7 314 U.S. 219 at 237, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941). 
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decisions on their admissibility seem to vary with the fact situation and 
the composition of the court.8 Perhaps the most significant feature of the 
trend was the establishment of the principle enunciated in Palko v. Con-
necticut that only such provisions of the Bill of Rights as are "implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty" are secured against state interference 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.9 If this broad standard is the substance of 
due process, differences in the kind of pressure employed in obtaining 
confessions would seem to be less significant than if the concept were 
better defined.10 The Supreme Court has never said that, in the absence 
of an adequate immunity statute, a state may punish a witness for refusing 
to answer self~incriminating questions. The result reached in the instant 
case does not jeopardize that principle, since New York had an immunity 
statute and Regan was protected by it except in so far as he waived that 
protection. His contempt conviction is consistent with the numerous 
holdings that immunity statutes may be substituted for the privilege 
against self-incrimination, thus compelling witnesses to testify.11 This 
analysis only moves the problem back one step, the question then being 
to what extent irregularities in the application of immunity statutes make 
their use a violation of due process. There would seem to be no doubt 
that states may provide for waivers of immunity12 or set qualifications 
for public office.13 When the two operations are combined, however, they 
may produce results not contemplated by either. If an employee must waive 
immunity or lose his job, he is deprived of both the right to refuse to 
testify and the im~unity that is supposed to replace that right. He may 
then be forced, by threat of imprisonment, to give self-incriminating testi-
mony. Whether this is contrary to the "concept of ordered liberty" is 
another matter. If there is a federal privilege here, it is possible that a 
state may be prohibited from violating it by conditioning the retention 
s Finding a violation of due process: Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 
921 (1944); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 74 S.Ct. 716 (1954). Finding no violation of 
due process: Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 73 S.Ct. 1077 (1953). See, generally, 39 
CoRN. L. Q. 321 (1954). 
9 302 U.S. 319 at 325, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937). 
10 But see 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §823 (1940). If, as Dean Wigmore suggests, 
the sole principle behind the exclusion of such evidence is a want of trustworthiness, the 
possibility of finding a violation of due process in the use of evidence "coerced" by a 
waiver of immunity is considerably lessened. 
11 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S.Ct. 644 (1896); United States v. Murdock, 
284 U.S. 141, 52 S.Ct. 63 (1931). 
12 See 39 N.Y. Consol Laws (McKinney, 1954) §2446, which authorizes the filing of 
voluntary waivers of immunity, and which has been in force since 1912. The provisions of 
the New York Constitution (cited in note 1 supra), relating to the dismissal of public 
officers for refusing to testify or waive immunity, were added in 1938. Their constitu-
tionality has never been tested. 
13 See Canteline v. McClellan, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E. (2d) 972 (1940); Wilson v. 
North Carolina, 169 U.S. 586, 18 S.Ct. 435 (1898); 30 CoL. L. REv. 1160 (1930). On the 
use of N.Y. City Charter (note 1 supra), to effect the dismissal of public sch~l teachers 
for invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, see Daniman v. Board of Education, 
306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E. (2d) 373 (1954), noted in 54 MICH. L. R.Ev. 126 (1955). 
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of state privileges upon its renunciation.14 On the other hand, this seems 
to be precisely what is done with this privilege by statutes governing certain 
commercial records and accident reports. It has been consistently held 
that one may not refuse to supply required information by claiming a 
privilege against self-incriminationP Yet in spite of the difficulties that 
may be encountered in distinguishing these situations, the present opinion, 
supplemented by what can be known of the Court from previous announce-
ments on the subject,16 warns that there may soon be another extension of 
the due process clause in the direction indicated by the concurring opinion.17 
Frank M. Lacey 
14 Cf. Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 ·U.S. 529, 42 S.Ct. 188 (1922). 
15 People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913); State v. Davis, 108 Mo. 
666, 18 s.w. 894 (1891). 
16 A majority of the Court has shown a tendency to permit a broader interpretation 
of due process: Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark here; Justices Black and Douglas 
here and elsewhere; Justice Frankfurter in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1357 
(1949). 
17 A further suggestion made by Chief Justice Warren was to treat the use of waivers 
against those no longer holding public office as violations of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. For New York's handling of "duration" in waivers of 
immunity, see Berson v. Goldstein, (Sup. Ct. 1953) 124 N.Y.S. (2d) 452; People ex rel. 
Hofsaes v. Warden of City Prison, 302 N.Y. 403, 98 N.E. (2d) 579 (1951). 
